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Abstract — Asset-managed sukuk is a pure innovation that we 
prototyped in the French market where SMEs financing is a 
national priority due to the bad economic conditions. This paper 
aims at presenting the result of the research and structuring 
exercise over a prototype for a Mudaraba Sukuk which is being 
proposed to the market, hoping to open the doors to more project 
finance type sukuk issuance, especially for (small) Euro 
denominated ticket.  
We discuss how the main issues arisen to SMEs financing such as 
opacity of information, lack of historic track-record, adverse 
selection in the theoretical framework of asymmetry of 
information can be resolved using an incentivized scheme of asset 
management along with a strong security package that holds 
ownership access rights in the hands of investors. 
Key words : Islamic Finance, sukuk, asset management, SME, 
asset finance, France study 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of the epic Lehman Brothers‘ crash as a 
conventional bank is much well known and reported than the 
crash occurred in the Sukuk market in the year 2007-2008. The 
latter is not due to a single player fading away on the pile of its 
debt but it represents the systemic impact of a statement and a 
later clarification from the global standards‘ setting body in the 
Islamic Finance world, the AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions).    
AAOIFI‘s previous president of the Sharia Council 1 , a 
well-respected scholar in the market, declared in a statement in 
November 2007 that some ―85 per cent of outstanding sukuk 
had failed the Shariah-compliance test on the basis that they 
were ‗asset-based‘ rather than ‗asset-backed‘ with the 
guaranteed return of the face value of the sukuk on maturity 
and in the absence of a transfer in asset ownership to sukuk 
holders‖. This statement had many impacts, first on the volume 
of Sukuk issuance in the market and second, on the juridical 
validity of sukuk which became unstable. In effect, this 
statement surprises the whole Islamic finance market and 
triggered a backlash on all Sukuk structures that were mere 
copy of their conventional counterparts. Later on, in February 
2008, AAOIFI issued a guidance statement on accounting for 
                                                          
1 Pr. Taqi Usmani, speech on Sukuk and their Contemporary 
Applications, 2007 
investments and amendment in FAS 17. Summary of important 
issues raised in this guideline are:  
- Sukuk issuances have to be backed by real assets, the 
ownership of which has to be legally transferred to sukuk 
holders in order to be tradable;  
- Sukuk must not represent receivables or debts, except in the 
case of a trading or financial entity selling all its assets or a 
portfolio with a standing financial obligation, in which, 
some debts owing by third parties, incidental to physical 
assets or usufruct, are unintentionally included;  
- The manager of the sukuk is prohibited from extending 
―loans‖ to make up for the shortfall in the return on the 
assets, whether acting as a mudarib (investment manager), 
or sharik (partner) or wakil (agent);  
- Guarantees to repurchase the assets at nominal value upon 
maturity with the exception of Ijarah sukuk structures are 
also prohibited; and  
- Closer scrutiny of documentation and subsequent execution 
of the transaction is required by Shariah Supervisory 
Boards. 
Maurer (2010 [1]) investigated this controversial issue and 
concluded that for some, Usmani‘s declaration was a much 
needed corrective because of bad market practice due to the 
excesses of sukuk issuances and structured financing vehicles 
too close to conventional bonds. To others, it was an 
overreaction, born of impatience with the pace of development 
of Islamic financial institutions and markets, and a too 
optimistic view of the state of Islamic finance that needs to 
depend less on the globally interconnected and interdependent 
conventional world.  
From this date, Islamic finance academics and practitioners 
came to be more thoughtful on issuing sukuk on the basis of 
the ethics of Islam which is among the objectives of Islamic 
banking and finance, and is also one of the greatest means of 
establishing Islamic economies in society. This would be 
possible only if the tools used to develop and structure sukuk 
are in consonance with the fundamental principles which 
distinguish Islamic economic systems from others. The basic 
concept behind issuing sukuk is for the Sukukholder to share in 
the profits of commercial enterprises. If sukuk are issued on 
this basis, they will play a major role in development of Islamic 
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banking and finance and thereby contribute significantly to the 
achievement of the noble objectives sought by Islam. 
In practice though, if Sukuk are clearly not defined as 
conventional shares or bonds, they are somehow defined 
according to the AAOIFI standard norm number 17 as 
―certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in the 
ownership of tangible assets, usufructs and services or (in the 
ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special 
investment activity‖. This is unfortunately not a language that 
financial markets use, and practitioners
2
 have difficulties in 
scoping to what extent sukuk can or should be considered as 
equity or debt products. There is probably a missing gap 
between general standards such as AAOIFI ones and more 
practical guidelines driven by professional associations such as 
the Loan Market Association (LMA). 
If Sukuk have reached the point to be a necessary liquidity 
tool for the Islamic financial system, it poses still many 
challenges in their structuring and usage. They can be in 
numerous formats
3
, but are perceived by the market depending 
on their risk profile and their financial nature. Indeed, they are 
categorized on the one hand, from a legal and Islamic 
structuring level as asset-based (corporate risk and recourse to 
the originator) or as asset-backed (project risk with recourse to 
the underlying asset protected against the issuer‘s bankruptcy 
risk). As part of the fixed income family, sukuk requires 
tradability for their liquidity, which depends on their 
underlying assets together with the Islamic contractual 
relationships performed at the asset origination phase (sales, 
leasing or partnership Islamic type contracts). On the other 
hand, from a risk and finance structuring level, sukuk fall 
easily in the comparison with asset backed securities (ABS), 
profiled in terms of rating as secured or unsecured financing 
with senior ranking in the sense that a claim can be done on the 
assets directly or over the guarantor‘s balance sheet liabilities, 
where the original assets stand. 
Our intention in this paper is not to redesign a new sukuk 
structure or to argue whether Sovereign Sukuk are as 
performant as conventional bonds but rather, to study the 
different applications of sukuk as we believe not enough has 
been made on the ground to democratize the access of 
innovative and risk sharing instrument in favor of SMEs. We 
aim at introducing more transparency and clear cut nature of 
sukuk where investors understand the risk sharing purpose 
while issuers are channeled in a simpler execution mode with 
aligned asset management guidelines.   
As the overall market is evolving towards more ambitious 
structures such as perpetual or hybrid sukuk, or even trying to 
replicate the features prevailing in European jurisdictions such 
as Covered Bond or EuroBond, we developed a simple yet 
ambitious experimentation of a SME Sukuk as close as the 
partnership format required by Islamic ethics. We aim at 
exploring a third path, aside from the existing asset-based and 
asset-backed options, rendered in the form of an asset-managed 
                                                          
2
 The author is a market practitioner who has structured the 
first SME sukuk in France (listed on Bloomberg, 2012) 
3
 AAOIFI suggests more than 14 types of sukuk depending on 
their underlying contracts   
sukuk. The case we are detailing in this paper uses the cash 
flow to be generated from the project as a device which can be 
asset-managed by independent specialists and not the issuers‘ 
related entities in order to move away from potential conflict of 
interest. Regardless of the size of the originator, it can be a 
SME as we like it to be, the attractiveness of such sukuk stand 
in the robustness of the project cash flow and the capacity of 
the third party to ensure the proper execution of the business 
plan using an incentivized profit sharing ratio model in the true 
spirit of mudaraba agreement. We use simple yet innovative 
agreement through asset management mandates in a mudaraba 
setup rather than plan vanilla asset-based Sukuk that replicates 
conventional risk return profile.   
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss asset 
securitization features and comparison with the Islamic version 
in section 2 and 3. In section 4, we analyze whether 
securitization can be applicable to SMEs needs and under 
which conditions. Our experimentation on a real case for a 
French SMEs is used in section 5 to highlight the features of 
such asset-managed sukuk along its challenges. We conclude 
in section 6 on to how new avenues can be explored by market 
participants for SMEs financing alternatives. 
II. ASSET SECURITIZATION: A RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
FUNDING DEVICE 
Securitization is the transformation of an illiquid asset into 
a security, this is a broad definition accepted by the economic 
literature. This process of creating securities can be done for 
public or private markets from an individual portfolio or from 
multiple portfolios of assets (type of assets that we will develop 
later). Asset securitization, more precisely, is a structured 
finance technique that consists of taking credit to be provided 
directly to market institutional investors rather than through 
financial intermediaries. The rationale behind securitization is 
quite simple. It is based on the assumption that assets are, in 
certain conditions, worth more off the balance sheet of the 
creditors than on it (Giddy, 2001)
4
.  
But the way securitization is done has evolved over the 
years. One can undisputedly say that the financial crisis of 
2008 has changed both the way conventional and Islamic 
securitizations are performed. We will discuss in detail one 
after each other the conditions in which these processes work, 
highlighting their positive impact in terms of funding and risk 
management. 
A. What is the value proposition of securitization? 
 
Securitization transfers financing from the firm to capital 
markets. It is clearly one of its best value propositions to act as 
a disintermediation from the financial intermediaries such as 
banks or credit institutions. The whole question is to evaluate 
the nature of this transfer and the potential shortcomings in 
terms of asymmetry of information and conflict of interests 
from the parties involved in the process.  
                                                          
4
 Presentation on the securitization process, Stern School of 
Business, NYU, I. Giddy 
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By engaging in securitization, both conventional and 
Islamic institutions are looking for debt refinancing 
alternatives, thanks to capital markets which have proven their 
capacity to efficiently allocate funds to assets‘ exposures. 
Research conducted by IMF staff (Čihák and Hesse, 2008 [2]; 
Hesse, Jobst and Solé, 2008 [3]; Jobst, Kunzel, Mills and Sy, 
2008 [4]) show that securitization serves as a refinancing 
mechanism to diversify external sources of asset funding and to 
transfer specific risk exposures.  
According to the authors, asset securitization converts 
regular cash flows from a diversified portfolio of illiquid 
present or future receivables (liquidity transformation and asset 
diversification process) of varying maturity and quality 
(integration and differentiation process) into negotiable capital 
market paper (―tranches‖) issued by either the originator of the 
securitized assets/receivables or a non-recourse, single-asset 
finance company (―special-purpose vehicle‖ (SPV)). So these 
tranches are contingent claims on a designated portfolio of 
securitized assets, which can be ―divided into different slices of 
risk to appeal to a range of investors‖ (Wighton, 2005 [5]).  
Issued debt securities differ in seniority and risk exposure 
(―stratified positions‖), whose subordination creates leveraged 
investment on the performance of securitized assets (―reference 
portfolio‖). Both investment return (principal and interest 
repayment) and losses associated with the underlying reference 
portfolio are allocated among the various tranches through 
prioritized contractual repartitioning according to subordination 
(Telpner, 2003 [6]).  
This risk sharing mechanism sustains a fine-tuned security 
design of customized debt securities with optimal mean-
variance properties. Hence, issuers of asset-backed securities 
improve overall market efficiency by offering marketable 
financial claims on securitized asset exposures at merchantable 
quality (Kendall, 1996 [7]).  
From a broader economic perspective as asserted by the 
IMF research team, the evolution of efficient securitization 
markets has served to mitigate disparities in the availability and 
cost of credit in primary lending markets by linking singular 
credit facilities to the aggregate pricing and valuation discipline 
of the capital markets.  
B. Risk management and information transparency 
 
Issuers are enablers of asset risks diversification through 
disintermediated debt refinancing. The economic reasoning of 
securitization is based on the ability of issuers as profitable 
enterprises to maximize shareholder value as the principal goal 
of economic activity. Management decisions evaluate the 
economic impact of different business ventures on shareholder 
value. Financial activities within business entities have to use 
their expertise and funds into the execution of business plans 
that can be understood by capital markets which are the 
ultimate source of capital. 
There are benefits of the securitization to the originators as 
well as investors and how it could mitigate the risks in the 
capital market which are as follows: 
For originators:  
- Transforming relatively illiquid assets into liquid and 
tradable capital market instrument.  
- Cheaper financing cost due to higher rating via credit 
enhancement. 
- Allows diversification of financing sources.  
- Facilitates removal of assets from the organization‘s 
balance sheet.  
- Reduces cost of finance if SPV is serving as multiple 
originators by pooling assets.  
 
For investors:  
- Provides a variety of products choices at better spread that 
attract a diversified investor profile. 
- Variety and flexibility of credit, maturity and payment 
structures and terms via securitization techniques that 
allow investment products to be tailored to specific needs.  
- Pooling of diversified assets with heterogeneous risk 
mitigates‘ earning risk.  
- Undivided ownership of the assets is an added protection.  
 
For capital markets:  
- The existence of secondary securitization markets 
facilitates benchmark purposes.  
- Facilitates and encourages efficient allocation of capital.  
- Enables reduction of risk within the banking system. 
 
Securitisation confers upon issuers mainly financial 
advantages related to more competitive capital management 
through efficient asset funding. Further objectives of 
securitisation might also include active balance sheet 
restructuring, market-oriented risk management of credit risk 
and diversified liquidity.  
According to the IMF research, Risk Management is a 
transmission and control mechanism, which encapsulates 
different approaches by firms which choose between the risk-
return profiles of alternative (investment) strategies to 
maximize shareholder value. Asset securitisation is one 
operational means of risk management, which allows issuers to 
reallocate, commoditise and transfer different types of risks 
(e.g. credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk or pricing risk) 
to capital market investors in return for some fair market price. 
While banks and other financial institutions view securitisation 
as a way to alleviate the regulatory capital charges for credit 
exposures of similar risk (―optimisation of regulatory capital‖), 
non-financial entities would employ securitisation primarily for 
the liquidity management of existing trade receivables. And 
this is a pressuring demand from the SMEs, whether it relates 
to existing or future trade receivables, as we will see later. 
C. Capital structure choice and incentive problems in asset 
securitization 
 
Asset securitisation might also redress conflicts of interest 
between creditors and shareholders in the capital structure 
choice of firms concerning possible agency costs from 
―underinvestment‖ (Myers, 1977 [8] and 1984 [9]) and ―asset 
substitution‖ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 [10]) due to 
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excessive levels of debt or the presence of non-value 
maximising investment behaviour respectively. Benveniste and 
Berger (1987 [11]) show that securitisation tranches resemble 
secured debt, whose agency costs may be lower than for 
unsecured debt. Similar to secured debt, securitisation allows 
issuers to appropriate partial debtholder wealth by carving out a 
defined pool of assets to satisfy securitised debt claims, which 
do not capture gains from the firm‘s future investments. This 
prioritisation of debtor claims potentially alleviates 
underinvestment and renders existing debt less inhibitive on the 
realisation of new investment opportunities. As a consistent 
consequence of the thinking about the capital structure choice, 
issuers, large or small companies, with high agency costs of 
debt and/or low growth prospects should be more likely to 
engage in asset securitisation. 
Analysing the effects of asset securitisation on the capital 
structure decision as a funding choice under asymmetric 
information holds also true. Under the pecking order theory 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984 [12]) issuers with severe information 
asymmetry problems would prefer to issue secured debt (i.e. 
asset backed), which carries lower agency cost, because 
investors receive their repayment directly from a diversified 
pool of asset exposures insulated from the issuer (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999 [13]). The trade-off theory would 
restrict this choice only to cases where the marginal benefit of 
debt outweighs the associated amount of agency and financial 
bankruptcy cost. Hence, under the pecking order and trade-off 
theory, asset securitisation is the refinancing instrument of 
choice for issuers looking to commoditize their asset book, but 
issuers who are suffering from high agency costs of 
asymmetric information. 
The complex security design of securitised debt also 
suggests superior information of issuers about the true 
valuation of securitised debt. Hence, rational investors would 
form negative beliefs about the actual quality of securitised 
assets and expect the adverse selection of securitised debt with 
poor reference portfolios similar to the lemons market problem 
famously proposed by Akerlof (1970 [14]). Since investors 
assume all (or most) transactions to be of poor quality, they 
request a reservation utility in the form of a lower selling price 
and/or higher return (―underpricing‖) as compensation for the 
anticipated investment risk of a disproportionately large share 
of poor transactions in the securitisation market. Recognizing 
the asymmetric information, issuers suppress the pecuniary 
charge associated with the lemons premium by soliciting 
increased transparency about the true value of securitised assets 
through signalling and screening mechanisms. Commonly 
issuers commit additional internal and external resources to a 
securitisation transaction, such as reserve funds, variable 
proceeds from excess spread as well as second loss positions 
and liquidity facilities, as a costly signal of asset quality. 
Asset securitization is generally performed through two 
techniques, which is a good way to understand where Islamic 
securitization stands in this perspective, subject of our next 
section.  
An asset-backed bond (ABB) is a debt obligation 
collateralized by a reference portfolio of on-balance-sheet 
assets of the originator. ABBs are over-collateralized as a form 
of credit enhancement, i.e., the value of securitized assets 
exceeds the notional value of issued debt obligations. As 
opposed to pass-through transactions, the cash flows from the 
reference portfolio are not dedicated to investors, who have no 
direct ownership rights to them. Frequently, the underlying 
reference portfolio is reconfigured, with a residual claim held 
by the issuer/originator. A pass-through payment structure 
conveys direct ownership of investors in a reference portfolio 
of off-balance-sheet assets, which are similar in maturity and 
quality. The originator services the portfolio, makes the 
collections and passes them on, less servicing fee, to 
investors—without reconfiguration of the cash flows. A pay-
through bond combines security features of both a pass-through 
and an ABB. One can argue that the originator‘s role is yet to 
be asserted in the true spirit of Islamic finance regarding 
transparency and avoidance of uncertainty providing ground to 
conflits of interest (gharar). 
III. ISLAMIC SECURITIZATION: AN ENFORCED RISK-SHARING 
DEVICE 
Securitization is probably one of the most important 
financial innovations that occurred in the last part of the 
previous century. The economic development of the 
conventional financial markets relied for a great part on 
securitization, which introduced a fundamental change in the 
banking industry. Indeed, it allows banks and also non-
financial firms to access a great liquidity management tool for 
a better use of their assets tied in their balance sheet. With the 
new funds raised off the sale of the loans, they can increase 
new lending. At the same time, risk transfer has increased 
significantly due to securitization. In fact, as illustrated by the 
subprime crisis, there was a pressure for the banks to gear up 
their loan origination capacity and the distribution of their risk: 
soon after the loan has been granted, it is packaged into a 
bundle of other mortgages, given a risk assessment by a rating 
agency and sold out through Asset Backed Securities.  
Securitization has somehow shaped a new type of banking 
called the Originate To Distribute (OTD) model, where 
relationship with the customer is reduced in favor of a 
transaction-based bank where its main proceeds come from the 
fees they earn originating and packaging loans. 
This OTD model is not free of risks as the subprime and 
general financial markets crisis has shown. The main issue 
stands from the incentives that the lender is given, in order to 
properly screen and monitor borrowers, since it is going to get 
rid-off the credit risk as soon as possible.  
On a different perspective, Islamic Finance has grown up 
on the tenets of some moral background that favors risk sharing 
principles (al-Ghunm bi al-Ghurm) and transparency 
prescription (gharar).  
Other principles such as the prohibition of interest-bearing 
activities (riba), speculation (maysir) and the obligation to 
engage in entrepreneurship type of investment away from bad 
faith behaviors (alcohol, pornographic, casino, etc.) have led 
Islamic financial institutions trying to replicate the 
conventional finance via more complex structural arrangements 
of contingent claims (Mirakhor and Iqbal, 1988 [15]). 
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Although both Islamic and conventional finance are in 
substance equivalent to for-profit finance and yield the same 
lender and investor pay-offs at the inception of the transaction, 
they differ in legal form and might require a different valuation 
due to dissimilar transaction structures (and associated legal 
enforceability of investor claims) and/or security design (Jobst, 
2006 [16]). Most importantly, Islamic finance substitutes a 
temporary use of assets by the lender for a permanent transfer 
of funds to the borrower as a source of indebtedness in 
conventional lending. Retained asset ownership by the lender 
under this arrangement constitutes entrepreneurial investment 
which is the key towards both SMEs finance and Islamic 
Finance. The financier receives returns from the direct 
participation in asset performance in the form of state-
contingent payments according to an agreed schedule and 
amount. This is a main pillar of Islamic finance techniques 
which pose challenges to be applicable in the different 
jurisdictions or banking system too much geared towards 
collateral-based debt, and it is especially true for SMEs looking 
for Islamic finance alternatives.  
A. Adapting the Principles of Islamic Finance to 
Securitization 
 
Since most Islamic financial products are based on the 
concept of asset backing, the economic concept of asset 
securitization is particularly adaptable to the basic requirements 
of Islamic finance. Islamic securitization refers to the process 
in which ownership of the underlying assets is transferred to a 
large number of investors in the form of instrument, namely 
sukuk. The ownership of the securitized assets is transferred to 
a separate entity that is set up for dual purpose of managing the 
assets on behalf of the sukukholders and for issuance of the 
investment certificates. The contractual rights attached to 
sukuk determine the mutual ownership and benefits of the 
securitized assets for the individual investors who subscribe to 
the sukuk. The sukuk holders earn any revenue generated by 
the project in the form of sale or leasing agreements 
(Murabaha, Ijara, Salam, Istisna) and/or capital appreciation of 
the assets involved through partnership-based agreement 
(Mudaraba, Musharaka, Wakala bil Istithmar). 
Islamic securitization transforms bilateral risk sharing 
between borrowers and lenders in Islamic finance into the 
market-based refinancing of one or more underlying Islamic 
finance transactions (Hesse, Jobst and Solé, 2008 [3]). In its 
basic concept, originators would sell existing or future 
revenues from lease receivables (asset-based), sale-back profit 
(debt-based at nominal value) or private equity from a portfolio 
of Islamically acceptable assets (asset-backed) to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) which refinances itself by issuing 
unsecured securities to market investors, most of the time 
represented by a trustee or an outside manager. The investors 
assume the role of a ―collective financier‖ whose 
entrepreneurial investment does not involve guaranteed, 
interest-based earnings. 
Islamic securitization must confer upon investors clearly 
identifiable rights and obligations in securitized assets in order 
to ensure direct participation in the distribution of risk and 
reward of the contractual agreements with limited risk 
mitigation. Hence, from a procedural and substantive 
perspective, Islamic securitization would need to involve the 
conversion of uncertain, business related proceeds of direct 
investment in real economic activity compliant with the Islamic 
ethics.  
Based on the requirements set out by Islamic Scholars, the 
conventional pass-through payment structure (i.e., equity 
participation) of traditional securitization seems to be closest to 
the strict interpretation of Islamic principles, which require the 
transfer of a minimum level of ownership to ensure direct 
investor participation in the business risk associated with the 
performance of a dedicated collateral pool of securitized assets. 
If the pass-through transaction removes the securitized assets 
from the originator‘s balance sheet (off-balance sheet), 
ownership conveyance through true sale should satisfy the 
required criteria from Islamic law to compute the exclusive 
dedication of cash flows from the underlying asset to establish 
the linkage of ownership interest to identifiable economic 
activity.  
B. Sukuk as a way to approach asset securitization 
 
Sukuk are not new for the international capital markets 
anymore with all major institutions looking to grasp a share of 
this growing market. Over the last few years, sukuk have 
evolved as a viable form of capital market-based Islamic 
structured finance, which reconciles the concept of 
securitization and principles of the shariah law on the provision 
and use of financial products and services in a risk-mitigation 
structure subject to competitive pricing (El-Qorchi, 2005 [17]). 
Sukuk are not only issued by entities from the Islamic world 
but also from the non-Islamic, the latest participants on the 
launch list being The UK, Luxembourg, South-Africa, Senegal, 
following multinational companies initiated by Shell in the 
1990s, GE in 2009 and the latest international banks such as 
HSBC, Société Générale, etc.  
According to Moody‘s5, due to the nature of sukuk, all 
transactions are likely to involve a set of underlying assets. 
Both parties – the issuer and the investors – share the risks in 
the transaction. Where investors enjoy asset-backing, they 
benefit from some form of security or lien over the assets, and 
are therefore in a preferential position over other unsecured 
creditors. In other words, in the event that the issuer were to 
default or become insolvent, the sukuk holders would be able 
to recover their exposure by taking control of, and ultimately 
realizing the value, from the underlying assets. In such a case, 
the transaction may achieve a higher rating, compared to the 
unsecured issuer rating of the originator, subject to certain 
conditions.  
Where the transaction is asset-based (which has been the 
case for the vast majority of bank Sukuk so far), the originator 
undertakes to repurchase the assets from the issuer at maturity 
of the Sukuk, or upon a pre-defined early termination event, for 
an amount equal to the principal repayment. In such a 
                                                          
5
 Understanding Moody‘s Approach to Unsecured Corporate 
Sukuk, Special Comment, 2007 
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repurchase undertaking, the true market value of the underlying 
asset (or asset portfolio) is irrelevant to the sukuk holders, as 
the amount is defined to be equivalent to the notes. In this case, 
investors in sukuk rely wholly on the originator‘s 
creditworthiness for repayment. This class of skuk is identical 
to unsecured lending from a risk perspective and hence attracts 
a similar capital charge as reminded by Moody‘s.  
Further, if we refer to Moody‘s analysis for such structures, 
Sukuk ratings comply to the following methodology: 
- Asset-Backed Sukuk, for which the ratings are primarily 
dependent on a risk analysis of the assets; 
- Unsecured (Repurchase) Sukuk, for which ratings are 
primarily dependent on the riskiness of the 
borrower/sponsor/originator/lessee. 
C. Sukuk as a tool to structure return out of risk profiling 
 
The requirement of a direct linkage between identifiable 
assets and investors‘ funds under Islamic law belies the 
commercial interest of establishing a legal separation of assets 
from the bankruptcy estate of the asset originator.  
From a market practitioner‘s point of view, we distinguish 
between the two structures of sukuk contracts that convey 
shariah-compliant asset ownership to investors: either (i) asset 
originators themselves issue notes backed by existing Islamic 
assets, or (ii) the originator sells Islamic assets (and/or the 
proceeds thereof) to an unaffiliated SPV, which issues notes 
with a put/tender feature to fund the acquisition of assets. The 
notes are funded by the proceeds from the underlying assets 
paid to the SPV as part of the repurchase obligation by the 
asset originator. Depending on the claim-generating asset type 
of Islamic finance, the SPV acquires ownership rights on either 
(i) existing assets within a lease-purchase or sale-repurchase 
agreement, or (ii) future assets as equity investor, and 
structures the anticipated cash flows from these assets into 
sukuk payment obligations of different risk and maturity. 
These obligations entitle investors to a pro rata ownership in 
the SPV and the proceeds generated from the net revenue of a 
loan, a lease or an investment project. The amount of debt 
issued is limited to the value of assets held by the SPV. 
So far, research studies (Jobst, 2006 [16]) indicate that 
many sukuk issues have utilized sovereign guarantees to 
redress the prohibition of credit enhancement or any other form 
of provision that mitigates business risk. While tranche 
subordination can be replicated by the combination of sale-
leaseback contracts in conformity to Islamic law, other forms 
of credit enhancement in conventional securitization, such as 
over collateralization, reserve and spread accounts (―excess 
spread‖), and the retention of equity claims appear more 
difficult to implement within the limits of shariah compliance. 
If the issuer acts as residual claimant and retains undistributed 
cash flows generated from securitized assets as excess spread, 
the transaction would not qualify as a complete pass-through 
structure with full ownership by investors and might be 
deemed incompatible with shariah principles. Instead, under 
the tenet of direct participation in underlying business risk 
Islamic investors would need to contribute own income to fund 
a reserve account to cover possible losses. 
Securitisation is commonly understood as an important risk 
management tool, mainly because its inherent differentiation 
and integration process (risk restructuring) allow issuers to 
reduce their cost of investment funding by segregating the risk 
exposure of a designated pool of assets. However, the 
conversion of balance-sheet risk into marketable securitised 
debt involves refined and complicated financial structures, 
which affect how credit (or asset) risk, market risk, liquidity 
risk and operational risk. The degree of investment risk in asset 
securitisation stems from two areas, namely (i) the 
characteristics and performance of existing and/or future 
receivables and other financial assets as sources of payments to 
the securitisation transaction (collateral level) as well as (ii) the 
allocation and distribution of payments from securitised assets 
to holders of the various tranches of issued debt securities 
(security level) in accordance with specific payment priorities 
and loss tolerance levels. 
When investors are looking at securitisation transactions 
such as Sukuk deals, they are concerned with the credit (or 
asset) risk of fully and timely repayment of securitised assets in 
the underlying reference portfolio. Although credit risk transfer 
by means of structured finance debt obligations lies at the core 
of risk management through securitisation, there is a host of 
further credit risk contingencies beyond the collateral level, 
such as the servicing function of securitised assets, the payment 
of administrative fees to the SPV, the transfer of payments 
from debtors to investors and counterparty risk. Issuers apply 
structural provisions to mitigate credit risk, such as (internal or 
external) credit enhancement and risk sharing mechanisms 
(through the subordination of issued debt securities) to attain a 
desired credit risk profile for issued debt securities. 
The Islamic securitization market is still plagued by 
illiquidity due to limited depth and breadth, which inhibits 
efficient price discovery and information dissemination 
(Archer and Karim, 2002 [18]). Although the commoditization 
of illiquid asset exposures through securitization facilitates the 
disciplining effect of capital markets on risk management, the 
lack of information from private sources about securitized 
assets in many sukuk impairs fair market valuation. Moreover, 
the distribution for smaller corporate deals has often been 
restricted to one ―buy-and-hold‖ investor in the past, while the 
prevalence of sovereign guarantees has made asset risk 
incidental to counterparty risk and credit support mechanisms 
sponsored by sovereign goodwill, hampering market maturity 
and investor sophistication. Beyond this economic and market 
maturity challenges, it is important as well to see if Islamic 
securitization, in one form or another, can be an alternatives to 
smaller entities in the long run, part of the mission of Islamic 
finance to serve the real economy. 
IV. SMES FINANCING AND ALTERNATIVES: IS 
SECURITIZATION AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE? 
 
As a short introduction to this section, it is important to 
recall that SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) are at the 
heart of European industrial R&D and innovation. Far from 
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being the left over from business entities, they are a vibrant and 
innovative part of the European economy. SMEs account for 
99% of all firms in Europe, approximately two thirds of total 
private sector employment and play a disproportionately 
important role in generating employment.  
In France and as elsewhere, there has been lengthy debate 
on whether the banks are still providing enough credit to SMEs 
during this time of recession. On the one side, banks argue that 
new capital adequacy requirements such as Basel II and III are 
a putting strain on their capacity to allocate loans to riskier and 
smaller corporates like SMEs. On the other side, governments 
are thriving to provide liquidity and guarantees to the market in 
order to sustain the origination of credit to smaller players that 
cannot have a direct access to capital markets. 
The question comes then to whether SMEs can tap into 
alternative sources of funding, from non-financial institutions 
or from institutional investors directly. To this end, many 
academic and government-led research have been conducted, 
probably the most comprehensive report has been done at the 
European commission level with the latest SME Loan 
Securitization initiative
6
.  
From this perspective, it is understood that banks do not 
lend to SMEs to support the economy but make a complex 
calculation of the profitability of their SME business, 
especially in relation to their other activities. In these 
calculations there are multiple parameters such as origination, 
credit assessment and servicing costs (Kraemer-Eis et al, 2010 
[19]). However, the degree to which banks can transfer their 
assets (market liquidity) is a fundamental driver for banks‘ 
asset allocations and lending decisions. Acknowledging that 
SME loans are amongst the least liquid assets in all of the 
European countries, the SME loan securitisation has been 
launched in order to ease the current situation. 
A. European Commission’s approach to SMEs financing 
 
The European Commission and especially the European 
Investment Fund, SMESec ―creates indirectly a secondary 
market for SME loans, combined with funding for the 
originator: a bank acting as the originator extends loans to its 
SME customers, bundles them together in a pool and sells the 
portfolio to capital market investors through the issuance of 
notes by a special purpose vehicle backed by such a loan 
portfolio (asset-backed securities)‖ (Kraemer-Eis et al, 2010 
[19]). 
What was true for securitization in general as discussed 
earlier, is true for SMEs as well. Securitization of SME loans is 
the most efficient means to enhance access to debt finance by 
SMEs: by transferring their credit risk to the capital markets in 
an effective manner, banks achieve capital relief and free up 
capacity for new loans to SMEs. Again, the question is what is 
meant by transfer of risk which would need to comply to 
Islamic rules if Islamic funding is to be call upon to be 
                                                          
6
 SME loan securitisation (SMESec) 
www.eif.org/EIF_for/sme_finance/index.htm accessed on 
May 10th, 2014 
allocated to European SMEs. In short, any initiative has to have 
features of a risk sharing instrument which means to engage 
not only the liabilities side of the security but the asset side as 
well, in effect, sharing the tangible underlying assets that 
provide the necessary ground for any claims and the substance 
of the profit share. Risk sharing is the new mantra for the 
financial world, whether we are ready or not, it is collective 
challenge to overcome its fair assessment within acceptable 
level of transparency and costs.   
B. Information asymmetries and transaction costs for SMEs 
 
Information asymmetries are a key determinant of the 
problems experienced by SMEs in accessing funding, as they 
are the basis for a structural hesitancy of providers of SME 
finance. Transaction costs first and foremost tend to magnify 
the impact of information asymmetries in financial 
transactions, thereby aggravating the conditions faced by 
smaller firms.  
Asymmetric information is a more serious problem in SME 
financing than in banking activities of larger firms. OECD 
(2006 [20]) states that ―the entrepreneur has access to better 
information concerning the operation of the business and has 
considerable leeway in sharing such information with 
outsiders. However, the entrepreneur is also likely to have less 
training/experience in business than those in a larger company, 
although more adapted to operating in an uncertain 
environment. Hence, it may be difficult for the outside provider 
of financing to determine whether the entrepreneur is making 
erroneous decisions or for the outsider to understand the 
business adequately. In addition, the entrepreneur may have 
incentives to remain opaque, not only in dealings with 
financiers, but also with outsiders such as regulators and tax 
authorities.‖  
The literature on information asymmetry suggests three 
ways to reduce it: a firm‘s ability to signal its credit worthiness 
(including an institutional assessment or rating by an 
independent agency and the provision of collateral), a strong 
relationship between lender and borrower (proximity), and 
through due diligence/lenders‘ examination (screening). Small 
enterprises, young companies or start-ups by definition have no 
track record, often only limited collateral, and no long standing 
relationship with lenders. One could even simplify that: the 
smaller the company, the bigger the information asymmetry 
and thus the higher the transaction costs in relative terms (Pelly 
and Kraemer-Eis, 2011 [21]).  
Moreover, the use of collateral increases the cost of lending 
(from the perspective of the borrower, e.g. legal and 
administrative cost), and the collateral may be worth more to 
the borrower than to the lender. Credit guarantee mechanisms 
are intended to address these market failures as they reduce the 
financial loss of the lender in case of default of the borrower 
(OECD, 2013 [22]).  
SME loans are, in principle, less homogenous than 
residential mortgages (with regard to size, legal forms, 
collateral etc.) and the underwriting criteria are less 
standardised. On the other hand, SME loans are typically 
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thoroughly analysed by credit experts and systems (e.g. most 
banks apply detailed quantitative internal rating methodologies 
on top of more qualitative assessments). Moreover, banks 
normally use a relationship banking approach and know their 
customers very well, thus enabling them to manage the risk of 
the customer over the long term in contrast to the more 
automated lending decisions seen in the mortgage and credit 
card markets. This distinguishes the European initiative 
SMESec from those other securitised asset classes.  
In order to restore confidence in this market and to revive 
primary market activities, greater standardisation and 
transparency is needed, as well as the avoidance of overly 
complex structures. Due to the challenges that the SME ABS 
market has been facing since the crisis, financial institutions 
have been seeking alternative means of funding SME loans. In 
Germany, Commerzbanks‘ issuance of a structured SME 
covered bond has attracted quite a lot of coverage and renewed 
the discussion of the participation of SME loans in the covered 
bond space, although this is a topic of hot debate at the 
moment.  
Moreover, in France a scheme is under discussion and 
development under the lead of the Bank of France to help 
banks to package SME loans into tradable securities via a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV). The approach combines 
elements of securitisation (i.e. French Fonds Commun de 
Titrisation (FCT) rules) and the covered bonds law (i.e. 
Societiés de Financement de l‘Habitat  (SFH)), in order to 
boost SME funding (Sanderson, 2013 [23]).  
These transactions can help to support SME financing via 
funding advantages for the originating  banks, and it might well 
be that in many countries legislators are going to introduce 
covered bonds legal frameworks. Achieving the same for 
Islamic Securitization would be a great step forward. 
C. Direct lending funds to SMEs and asset management of 
SMEs portfolio 
 
Given the sustaining credit crunch that is impacting heavily 
the SMEs, regulators and market professionals have been 
looking to banking alternatives to propel other forms of 
financing to this sector of economic activity. As a consequence 
of this context of prolonging European banking crisis, and the 
consequent changes in banking regulation and structures, a new 
asset class called SMEs direct lending is emerging. Report 
from Eurocredit Exchange
7
 suggests that SMEs direct lending 
is Europe‘s newest and most exciting real asset class and has 
the potential to become one of the largest. 
The structure of the debt tends to be bilateral loans secured 
on the operational businesses, with either a single lender or 
club of lenders participating. In broad terms, there are three 
typical types of structures most prevalent:  
- Lending alongside a bank: an institutional tranche with 
either a longer tenor or bullet structure alongside a bank‘s 
                                                          
7
 http://eurocreditexchange.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/MM-Direct-Lending-Overview-Jan-
2014.pdf accessed on May 14, 2014 
senior secured, covenanted, amortising loan tranche. 
Alternatively an institution provides similar bank-type 
financing directly.  
- Replacement of bank: unitranche or stretched senior 
product. Higher total commitment, higher leverage, 
additional covenant headroom and more flexible use of 
proceeds. A bank normally provides a super-senior 
revolving facility or perhaps a ―first out‖ piece.  
- Junior or subordinated lender: mezzanine or with an equity 
kicker or preferred equity.  
Direct-lending can have three distinct advantages over the 
traditional bank lending offer, namely longer term-financing, as 
well as more flexibility in both the structure (e.g. senior, 
mezzanine, unitranches and even equity contributions, non-
amortising, greater covenant headroom) and in the use of 
proceeds (e.g. growth, acquisition, capex and dividend recaps). 
Direct-lenders are also often willing to explore industry sectors 
and geographical jurisdictions that the main banks are now 
more reluctant to lend to. Naturally such flexibility may come 
at a higher cost to the borrower but this generally reflects an 
appropriate price and compensation for the higher respective 
risk.  
Direct-lending funds often have long lock-ups of 
committed capital, i.e. 5-10 years, and can therefore provide 
longer term financing (especially to levered corporates) than 
most banks (as a bank‘s capital requirement is a direct function 
of tenor and credit quality). Private placement bond investors 
can envisage even longer tenors, especially Pension schemes 
and Insurance Funds looking to match long-term liabilities. As 
the tenors are longer for these loans, and Direct-lenders are 
hold-to-maturity lenders, then respective borrowers and lenders 
become highly aligned to the long-term success of the business.  
Borrowers with access to more flexible, longer-term financing 
from non-bank institutional lenders can benefit from a more 
stable business outlook and greater operational flexibility. 
Direct-lenders do not require a borrower to have an official 
credit rating which represents a significant cost saving 
compared to the public corporate bond market.  
On the supply side, there are some growing advantages for 
long term institutional investors to allocate funds to SMEs over 
competing asset classes for different reasons:  
- It exhibits less volatile asset pricing  
- It enables increased diversification of corporate exposure  
- It provides better management of the illiquidity risk 
premium  
With the expertise of asset management team specialized in 
SMEs investment, funders such as insurance and pensions 
companies, can gain exposure to better risk-adjusted portfolio 
return, increased diversification of risks to corporate exposure 
(compared to existing large cap public bond and equity capital 
markets), lower pricing volatility (held at amortised cost) and 
be able to match direct-lending assets to liabilities in a more 
stable and transparent manner. This is a typical model setup in 
France with Asset Managers specialized in SMEs debt 
origination such as Acofi AM or Tikehau AM. 
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V. SMES ALTERNATIVES FINANCING IN FRANCE:  
PROTOTYPE OF A LOCAL SUKUK ISSUANCE  
 
SMEs financing issues in France are not new, different 
initiatives have spawn around from market professionals in 
order to come to adequate and accessible solutions.  
In an attempt to structure a Mudaraba-based partnership 
financing instrument specifically for SMEs, called a ―hybrid 
sukuk model‖, we achieved to launch the first private sukuk in 
the French market in 2012 (Patel, 2014 [24]). We demonstrated 
that, this setup makes transaction costs incrementally 
insignificant and as such, it does provide a credible alternative 
to conventional loans which are increasingly costly and 
inaccessible to smaller SMEs or entrepreneurs due to the credit 
crunch.  
In short, this first model was neither an equity partnership 
where the capital investors take most if not all power and 
upside gain nor a pure collateral-based debt with a pre-defined 
interest rate disconnected to the performance of the project. But 
it is a true value-sharing instrument between an entrepreneur 
(Mudarib) with its expertise and business idea, and investors 
(Rab al maal) committing to a participative debt funding 
component (sak) completely modeled on the business plan and 
potential value of the underlying assets making it truly a risk 
sharing transaction. It is not a win-lose situation as for a 
classical lender to borrower relationship but a participative 
financing method dependent on the success of the project to 
generate the necessary cash-flow that gives a chance to the 
entrepreneur to grow and be successful with a performance 
shared with its capital partners (sukuk holders).  
But this experience allows us to reflect on a broader 
perspective, and especially for SMEs that may not be able to 
provide tangible assets as collateral or a capital structure for 
quasi-equity financing. Indeed, we had to face many demands 
from French SMEs looking to working capital finance, trade 
finance, on a short to medium term needs with increasing size 
of capital allowance. We are detailing the salient points of our 
experience in the following case study. As background 
information, it is a meeting with an international scholar during 
the World Islamic Economy forum in Dubai in November 2013 
and a page in the report published by Zawya Reuters at this 
event called ―Air Time Sukuk‖ being proposed by international 
scholars in Asia that triggered the idea to prototype a new 
innovative sukuk SME structure in the French market.   
A. Case Overview 
 
In the late 2014, we have been approached by entrepreneurs 
looking to build on their trading operations between Europe 
and North Africa in the telecom business. The SME has a 
successful track record dealing with major international 
suppliers and clients in a niche sector but has to limit its 
purchasing capacity due to delay in payment from its 
customers. Working capital needs and receivables trading were 
the key business elements of this candidate for a new sukuk 
structure. In effect, the solution was to cover the funding gap 
for the timeframe when cash is submitted to the supplier in 
exchange of goods and the clients‘ payment cycle time which 
is ranging from 30 to 60 days.  
To this end, after a long analysis of its business model and 
cash flow generation in the Telecom industry, we devised a 
kind of reverse factoring model in order to use investors‘ 
money to make the trading purchase done on robust ground as 
we will explain later. Sharing the profit obtained when the 
payments will be received from the customers on a yearly basis 
is at the core of the structuring exercise, again inspired by what 
has been called Air time Sukuk by market practitioners (best 
examples with Mobily in Saudi Arabia, 2008; Etisalat in UAE, 
2010; Celcom in Malaysia, 2012).  
Below is the process followed to structure this SME 
Mudaraba Sukuk in a form of Participating Bond in French law 
which has gotten approval from French Sharia Scholars and 
has been attracting potential interests from French speaking 
countries (France, Luxembourg and North Africa). 
The Issuer is a French ―Société par Actions Simplifiée‖, i.e. 
a limited liability company whose shares are held entirely by 
the Sponsor. Its sole object and activity is to finance the 
working capital needs of trading activities for which the 
shareholders of the Sponsor have particular expertise and wish 
to finance on a limited recourse basis. 
For this purpose, the proceeds of the issuance of the 
Participating Bonds will be made available by the Issuer (the 
Mudarib) to a Commissioning Agent (legal name for the Wakil 
but in practice for our research discussion the Asset Manager) 
on a revolving basis under the terms of the Investment 
Agreement (Wakala) for the latter to purchase services from 
the suppliers and on-sell them, acting in its own name but on 
behalf of the Issuer, to the clients. One fundamental 
characteristic which is part of the whole transparency and 
tracking of the Mudaraba operations is that the agent will be 
entitled to make a cash call to the issuer to pay services to a 
given supplier only if at or prior to that time, there is an order 
from a client for a price that is higher than that payable to the 
relevant supplier. In this case, each cash call with the known 
buy and sell price will make the basis of the cash flow that will 
constitute the Mudaraba asset in order to compute the profit 
share between the Mudarib and the Investors (Rab al Maal). 
In effect, amounts received from the Agent by the issuer 
under any operations on a dedicated bank account in any given 
year shall be applied as the cash waterfall as follows: 
- First as payment of the relevant amount of commission 
and all other operating expenses of the issuer which are 
then due and payable; 
- Second to the credit of Reserve Account 1, which is a bank 
account that collects all the expected remuneration until 
the credit balance of such account is equal to the yearly 
required amount; 
- Third to the credit of Reserve Account 2, which is another 
separate bank account allowing to collect the aggregate of 
the required balance of that account (i.e. the nominal 
investment amount from the Sukukholders); 
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The Participating Bonds will carry the right to an expected 
remuneration equal to say 10 % per annum of the principal 
payable on each anniversary of the date of the issuance (this 
remuneration is derived from the profit sharing ratio set in the 
mudaraba agreement which is the essence of the Islamic 
structure). Should the proceeds of the trading operations not 
allow for the full payment of the expected remuneration in a 
given year, the Sukukholders will be entitled to receive a sum 
equal to the amount of gross profit margin received by the 
issuer during that year and credited to reserve account 1. 
Provided that no event of default has occurred and is 
continuing, payment of the shortfall will be carried over to the 
next date for payment of Expected Remuneration and will not 
attract late interest or penalties. If an Event of Default has 
occurred and is continuing, the Bondholders will be entitled to 
accelerate the repayment of the Participating Bonds and all 
sums owed in that respect.  
B. Structuring constraints from legal and sharia aspects 
 
Structuring such an ambitious product for a SMEs not 
familiar with structured finance required a robust financial and 
risk analysis with all necessary contracts setup to be agreed by 
the parties. The tenor of the Participating Bonds has been 
derived in order to procure enough capital flows for the issuer 
while securing the project risks from the investors‘ point of 
view. On top of the business planning and cash flow detailed 
analysis, there is a comprehensive security package that 
ensures that cash invested by the Sukukholders or the 
receivables arising out of the use of such cash is at all times 
secured for the benefit on the investors.  
This list of security interests for the benefit of the 
Sukukholders is the result of long discussions between the 
parties including the Sharia Scholars in order to achieve a fine 
balance between acceptable risk sharing engagements and yet 
suitable to conform to the required form and substance of 
validation from Islamic laws: 
- The shares in the issuer (SPV) are charged to the benefit of 
the Sukukholders so as to ensure, as much as possible, the 
transfer of the project as a going concern in the event of 
realization and that no change of control can effectively 
occur at that level; 
- The proceeds of the issuance will be paid into the reserve 
account 2 which will be secured to the benefit of the 
Bondholders. Any payment of the principal of a trading 
operation from a client will also be made by the 
commissioning agent into Reserve Account 2 shortly upon 
receiving such payment.  
- The client receivables of the commissioning agent against 
the client and the claim of the issuer against the investment 
agent for payment of the sums invoiced by the latter to the 
clients and, more generally, all claims of the issuer against 
the commissioning agent under the Wakala agreement will 
also be secured in favor of the Sukukholders so that in 
effect the principal of the Participating Bonds is always 
secured be it in the form of cash in Reserve Account 2 or 
in the form of the above mentioned receivables;  
The capacity of the Issuer to fulfil its obligations towards 
the Sukukholders relies on receiving sufficient amount of 
margin out of the trading operations, which involves: 
- Credit risk over the Operators which is mitigated by the 
credit quality of the existing Operators and the criterion for 
replacement or under consumption (acceptability to 
factoring companies);  
- Performance risk taken on the commissioning agent which 
is mitigated by the fact that it is managed and controlled 
by managers with a strong track record in telecom trading 
and the priority awarded to the expected remuneration on 
the results of the first Trading Operations each year 
- Operational risks regarding the process for the Trading 
Operations that a given client would withdraw a purchase 
order at a time where the commissioning Agent has made 
a cash call on the Issuer and has paid the corresponding 
Services to a supplier. Assumption of that risk is necessary 
in order for the structure to receive approval from the 
scholars committee.  
The Sukuk certificates will carry the right to an expected 
remuneration payable on each anniversary of the date of the 
issuance. Should the proceeds of the telecom operations not 
allow for the full payment of the expected remuneration in a 
given year, the Sukukholders will be entitled to receive a sum 
equal to the amount of gross profit margin received by the 
issuer during that year and credited to reserve account 1. 
Provided that no event of default has occurred and is 
continuing, payment of the shortfall will be carried over to the 
next date for payment of Expected Remuneration and will not 
attract late interest or penalties. If an Event of Default has 
occurred and is continuing, the sukukholders will be entitled to 
accelerate the repayment of the Sukuk and all sums owed in 
that respect as shown in figure 1 below. 
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C. Shifting sukuk from traditional banking towards direct 
web-based funding  
 
In this case, the mudaraba format of sukuk has been chosen 
to raise funds for different reasons. Mudaraba firstly, is part of 
the participating contracts that are praised by Islamic ethics as 
it truly engage parties in sharing risks before sharing profits 
eventually. Sukuk Mudaraba secondly, allow dividing the 
mudaraba capital (formed by cash from the investor and 
expertise from the operator) into equal value units representing 
shared ownership, each unit from the investors‘ capital is 
registered under a sukuk holder‘s name, which collectively 
reflect the common asset in mudaraba capital. Sukuk owners 
acquire a defined proportion of the project profit, which is set 
out in the sukuk issuance documentation (prospectus). 
Mudaraba sukuk neither yield interest nor entitle owner to 
make claims for any definite annual interest. This means that 
mudaraba sukuk are like shares with regard to vary returns, 
which are accrued according to the profits made by the project. 
This feature is not really specific to Islamic Finance as it is 
increasingly used in risk sharing finance which is especially 
getting more ground and appeal in the Crowdfunding 
dynamics. New types of loans are emerging among the 
different crowdfunding categories, not so for equity-based 
platforms but rather for reward-based or Profit/Revenue-
sharing platforms
8
. In effect, all this is reflecting a new 
direction of finance towards asset and project finance 
facilitated by third parties (asset management or crowdfunding 
platform) that execute a trust mandate on behalf of investors.  
Moreover, the other challenge in this case was to cope of 
the nature of the SMEs environment with lack of information, 
higher transaction costs and costs of risks. The approach from 
the beginning was to develop a first experiment that leverages 
structured finance and technology platform (called ―fintech‖) 
and exploring new structure such as an asset managed Sukuk 
class developed on a web-based platform that originates, 
underwrites and allocates funds from pool of investors to 
different targets, capitalizing on the variant options of 
structured financing/ securitization offered by Islamic Finance. 
The key aspect here regarding SMEs and the latency of these 
business operations is to leverage technology to automate and 
simplify the whole process in order to gain respectively, speed 
and reduced operational costs.   
Islamic securitization for Project Sukuk provides clear 
benefits to corporates but implies many impediments for 
smaller ventures. Our trial solution and its further 
developments consist of building a platform that is structured 
around few key features: 
- An alternative to bank financing for small firms by 
creating the condition of a « covered pool sukuk » based 
on project finance techniques (true sale of assets pledged 
                                                          
8
 The rise of future of finance, The UK Alternative Finance 
Benchmarking Report, Liam Collins, Nesta 
Richard Swart, University of California, Berkeley, Bryan 
Zhang, University of Cambridge, December 2013 
against secured business cash flow) that mutualises risks 
and rewards benefits; 
- The pricing of such project financing should reflect not the 
credit scoring of the borrower but the rating of the 
underlying assets with their cash flow risk profile using 
project finance techniques in addition to the crowd 
sentiment of the business rationale of the project (issuers 
incur an obligation to repay Sukukholders who, but these 
payments are variable and are a function of the revenues or 
profits of the project); 
- Transaction costs, thanks to technology, are incrementally 
reduced while process efficiency brings value to all parties 
especially investors who can have better transparency 
enabling better personal and trust relationships on a 
recurring basis (access to all information, anytime, 
anywhere, any device).  
Eluding on the dynamics of crowdfunding, it would be very 
interesting to see its evolution over the years and how Islamic 
Finance can mold itself in this new alternative finance. Islamic 
Finance can not only be part of the (r)evolution but more 
importantly, it can drive the risk-sharing model which is at the 
heart of its ethics. The potential of these new ways of 
financing, less opaque, less virtual, less disconnected to 
economic activities can provide great potential for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs all over. It can turbocharge the resurgence of the 
cooperative model, in a digital format this time, and it can 
enable the decentralisation of global corporate control which 
today is concentrated in few transnational financial institutions 
because of their banking monopoly and their power of creating 
money.  
It can also be instrumental in implementing lending 
marketplace such as the success of Lendingclub in the US or 
Funding Circle in the UK. Going back to our prototype 
facilitating working capital, it is interesting to note many 
initiatives are addressing the funding gap of invoices from 
SMEs with such platforms as Market Invoice in the UK or 
Finexkap in France, all new FinTech actors that are speeding to 
disintermediate the factoring and reverse factoring business.  
As we are wrapping up this paper, a new article on Reuter
9
 
announces that Tawreeq, based in Dubai and Luxembourg, is 
aiming to give smaller firms a funding alternative to bank 
loans, which can be cumbersome and costly for most. The idea 
is to provide an Islamic trade receivables financing platform 
catering to the Gulf region's small businesses, with plans to tap 
the capital markets to fund the venture. "Conventional 
factoring is more a form of discounting bills, while our model 
is about the collaboration of buyers and suppliers to offer 
complete cash-flow solutions." This is definitely a great move 
towards better solutions for SMEs leveraging the securitization 
techniques to trade receivables. But the challenge is not merely 
channeling invoices against cash after an interest charge over 
its payments but more profoundly, rethinking the supply chain 
of finance and trade, by engaging financial institutions (i.e. 
direct investors, asset managers…) in the trade process, within 
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the buying and selling cycle while sharing the risks and the 
profits. Asset-managed platforms are a great start. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: COOPERATION TOWARDS SUKUK 
MANDATES CARRIED OUT BY INDEPENDENT ASSET MANAGERS 
 
There have been some clear lessons learnt from the 
financial crisis which impacted substantially the securitization 
market. For instance, a study conducted by BearingPoint
10
 
asking market participants for an evaluation of selected 
measures to resurrect the securitisation market, highlighted 
some key messages: 
- The focus of future securitization deals will be on 
receivables from the real economy, especially for SMEs 
(78%), but no longer on the repackaging of securitisation 
tranches. 
- In order to resurrect the securitization market, 
transparency, standards and less complex transaction 
structures are required (84%).  
- An essential prerequisite for a functioning securitisation 
market is the supervision of the rating agencies (73%). 
In the case of Islamic securitization via partnership-based 
sukuk as discussed in this paper, it has great potential for 
promoting risk-sharing thereby increasing mobilization of 
savings and investment, hence spurring growth which leads to 
enhanced welfare. Sukuk are very convenient vehicles of 
transferring some of this liquidity to people capable of 
employing it into productive projects as exemplified by 
crowdfunding platforms. A diverse spectrum of investment 
vehicles serves persons with different perceptions of risks and 
returns, again the different crowdfunding models are pleading 
towards this trend. In this regard, Islamic securitization based 
on partnership principles have directed towards risk sharing 
due to wealth creation, to be shared between both fund 
providers (investors) and fund users (sukuk issuers), while both 
bear the risks involved and the resulting loss. 
If asset-based Sukuk does not hold real assets and asset-
backed Sukuk are difficult to perform the true sale of assets 
given legal and tax constraints, a third option is possible 
through this third way we called asset-managed Sukuk. The 
underlying assets are originated not from financial 
intermediaries but by asset-managers directly on behalf of 
investors. This is the virtue of the direct lending model, making 
all this much more practical, starting from local investors and 
reaching out to international investors.  
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